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Abstract
Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler provide an epistemic characterization of iterated ad-
missibility (i.e., iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) where uncertainty is represented
using LPSs (lexicographic probability sequences). Their characterization holds in a rich structure
called a complete structure, where all types are possible. Here, a logical charaacterization of iterated
admisibility is given that involves only standard probability and holds in all structures, not just com-
plete structures. A stronger notion of strong admissibility is then defined. Roughly speaking, strong
admissibility is meant to capture the intuition that “all the agent knows” is that the other agents
satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. Strong admissibility makes it possible to relate ad-
missibility, canonical structures (as typically considered in completeness proofs in modal logic),
complete structures, and the notion of “all I know”.
1 Introduction
Admissibility is an old criterion in decision making. A strategy for player i is admissible if it is a best
response to some belief of player i that puts positive probability on all the strategy profiles for the other
players. Part of the interest in admissibility comes from the observation (due to Pearce [1984]) that a
strategy σ for player i is admissible iff it is not weakly dominated; that is, there is no strategy σ′ for
player i that gives i at least as high a payoff as σ no matter what strategy the other players are using,
and sometimes gives i a higher payoff.
It seems natural to ignore strategies that are not admissible. But there is a conceptual problem when
it comes to dealing with iterated admissibility (i.e., iterated deletion of weaklhy dominated strategies).
As Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [1995, p. 240] put in their textbook when discussing iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies:
[T]he argument for deletion of a weakly dominated strategy for player i is that he con-
templates the possibility that every strategy combination of his rivals occurs with positive
probability. However, this hypothesis clashes with the logic of iterated deletion, which
assumes, precisely, that eliminated strategies are not expected to occur.
Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008] (BFK from now on) resolve this paradox in the
context of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies by assuming that strategies are not really
eliminated. Rather, they assumed that strategies that are weakly dominated occur with infinitesimal (but
nonzero) probability. (Formally, this is captured by using an LPS—lexicographically ordered probabil-
ity sequence.) They define a notion of belief (which they call assumption) appropriate for their setting,
and show that strategies that survive k rounds of iterated deletion are ones that are played in states
where there there is kth-order mutual belief in rationality; that is, everyone assume that everyone as-
sumes . . . (k− 1 times) that everyone is rational. However, they prove only that their characterization of
iterated admissibility holds in particularly rich structures called complete structures (defined formally in
Section 4), where all types are possible.
Here, we provide an alternate logical characterization of iterated admissibility. The characterization
simply formalizes the intuition that an agent must consider possible all strategies consistent with the
rationality assumptions he is making. Repeated iterations correspond to stronger rationality asumptions.
The characterization has the advantage that it holds in all structures, not just complete structures, and
assumes that agents represent their uncertainty using standard probability meaures, rather than LPS’s or
nonstandard probability measures (as is done in a characterization of Rajan [1998]). Moreover, while
complete structures must be uncountable, we show that our characterization is always satisfible in a
structure with finitely many states.
In an effort to understand better the role of complete structures, we consider strong admissibility.
Roughly speaking, strong admissibility is meant to capture the intuition that “all the agent knows”
is that the other agents satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. We are using the phrase “all
agent i knows” here in the same sense that it is used by Levesque [1990] and Halpern and Lakemeyer
[2001]. We formalize strong admissibility by requiring that the agent ascribe positive probability to
all formulas consistent with his rationality assumptions. (This admittedly fuzzy description is made
precise in Section 3.) We give a logical characterization of iterated strong admissibility and show that
a strategy σ survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies iff there is a structure and a state
where σ is played and the formula characterizing iterated strong admissibility holds. While we can take
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the structure where the formula holds to be countable, perhaps the most natural structure to consider is
the canonical structure, which has a state corresponding to very satisfiable collection of formulas. The
canonical structure is uncountable.
We can show that the canonical structure is complete in the sense of BFK. Moreover, under a tech-
nical assumption, every complete structure is essentially canonical (i.e., it has a state corresponding to
every satisfiable collection of formulas). This sequence of results allows us to connect (iterated admis-
sibility), complete structures, canonical structures, and the notion of “all I know”.
2 Characterizing Iterated Deletion
We consider normal-form games with n players. Given a (normal-form) n-player game Γ, let Σi(Γ)
denote the strategies of player i in Γ. We omit the parenthetical Γ when it is clear from context or
irrelevant. Let ~Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn.
Let Ł1 be the language where we start with true and the special primitive proposition RAT i and
close off under modal operators Bi and 〈Bi〉, for i = 1, . . . , n, conjunction, and negation. We think of
Biϕ as saying that ϕ holds with probability 1, and 〈Bi〉ϕ as saying that ϕ holds with positive probability.
As we shall see, 〈Bi〉 is definable as ¬Bi¬ if we make the appropriate measurability assumptions.
To reason about the game Γ, we consider a class of probability structures corresponding to Γ. A
probability structure M appropriate for Γ is a tuple (Ω, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where Ω is a set of
states; s associates with each state ω ∈ Ω a pure strategy profile s(ω) in the game Γ; F is a σ-algebra
over Ω; and, for each player i, PRi associates with each state ω a probability distribution PRi(ω)
on (Ω,F) such that, (1) for each strategy σi for player i, [[σi]]M = {ω : si(ω) = σi} ∈ F , where
si(ω) denotes player i’s strategy in the strategy profile s(ω); (2) PRi(ω)([[si(ω)]]M ) = 1; (3) for
each probability measure π on (Ω,F), and player i, [[π, i]]M = {ω : Πi(ω) = π} ∈ F ; and (4)
PRi(ω)([[PRi(ω), i]]M ) = 1. These assumptions essentially say that player i knows his strategy and
knows his beliefs.
The semantics is given as follows:
• (M,ω) |= true (so true is vacuously true).
• (M,ω) |= RAT i if si(ω) is a best response, given player i’s beliefs on the strategies of other
players induced by PRi(ω). (Because we restrict to appropriate structures, a players expected
utility at a state ω is well defined, so we can talk about best responses.)
• (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ if (M,ω) 6|= ϕ.
• (M,ω) |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ and (M,ω) |= ϕ′
• (M,ω) |= Biϕ if there exists a set F ∈ Fi such that F ⊆ [[ϕ]]M and PRi(ω)(F ) = 1, where
[[ϕ]]M = {ω : (M,ω) |= ϕ}.
• (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉ϕ if there exists a set F ∈ Fi such that F ⊆ [[ϕ]]M and PRi(ω)(F ) > 0.
Given a language (set of formulas) Ł, M is Ł-measurable if M is appropriate (for some game Γ)
and [[ϕ]]M ∈ F for all formulas ϕ ∈ Ł. It is easy to check that in an Ł1-measurable structure, 〈Bi〉ϕ is
equivalent to ¬Bi¬ϕ.
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To put our results on iterated admissibility into context, we first consider rationalizability. Pearce
[1984] gives two definitions of rationalizability, which give rise to different epistemic characterizations.
We repeat the definitions here, using the notation of Osborne and Rubinstein [1994].
Definition 2.1: A strategy σ for player i in game Γ is rationalizable if, for each player j, there is a set
Zj ⊆ Σj(Γ) and, for each strategy σ′ ∈ Zj , a probability measure µσ′ on Σ−j(Γ) whose support is a
subset of Z−j such that
• σ ∈ Zi; and
• for each player j and strategy σ′ ∈ Zj , strategy σ′ is a best response to (the beliefs) µσ′ .
The second definition characterizes rationalizability in terms of iterated deletion.
Definition 2.2: A strategy σ for player i in game Γ is rationalizable′ if, for each player j, there exists
a sequence X0j ,X1j ,X2j , . . . of sets of strategies for player j such that X0j = Σj and, for each strategy
σ′ ∈ Xkj , k ≥ 1, a probability measure µσ′,k whose support is a subset of ~X
k−1
−j such that
• σ ∈ ∩∞j=0Xi; and
• for each player j, each strategy σ′ ∈ Xkj is a best response to the beliefs µσ′,k.
Intuitively, X1j consists of strategies that are best responses to some belief of player j, and X
h+1
j con-
sists of strategies in Xhj that are best responses to some belief of player j with support Xh−j ; that is,
beliefs that assume that everyone else is best reponding to some beliefs assuming that everyone else is
responding to some beliefs assuming . . . (h times).
Proposition 2.3: [Pearce 1984] A strategy is rationalizable iff it is rationalizable′ .
We now give our epistemic characterizations of rationalizability. Let RAT be an abbreviation for
RAT 1∧. . .∧RATn; let Eϕ be an abbreviation of B1ϕ∧. . .∧Bnϕ; and defineEkϕ for all k inductively
by taking E0ϕ to be ϕ and Ek+1ϕ to be E(Ekϕ). Common knowledge of ϕ holds iff Ekϕ holds for all
k ≥ 0.
We now give an epistemic characterization of rationalizability. Part of the characterization (the
equivalence of (a) and (b) below) is well known [Tan and Werlang 1988]; it just says that a strategy is
rationalizable iff it can be played in a state where rationality is common knowledge.
Theorem 2.4: The following are equivalent:
(a) σ is a rationalizable strategy for i in a game Γ;
(b) there exists a measurable structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ
and (M,ω) |= EkRAT for all k ≥ 0;
3
(c) there exists a measurable structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ
and (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉EkRAT for all k ≥ 0;
(d) there exists a structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ and
(M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉E
kRAT for all k ≥ 0.
Proof: Suppose that σ is rationalizable. Choose Zj ⊆ Σj(Γ) and measures µσ′ for each strategy σ′ ∈
Zj guaranteed to exist by Definition 2.1. Define an appropriate structure M = (Ω, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn),
where
• Ω = Z1 × · · · × Zn;
• si(~σ) = σi;
• F consist of all subsets of Ω;
• PRi(~σ)(~σ
′) is 0 if σ′i 6= σi and is µσi(σ′−i) otherwise.
Since each player is best responding to his beliefs at every state, it is easy to see that (M,~σ) |= RAT
for all states ~σ. It easily follows (formally, by induction on k), that (M,~σ) |= EkRAT . Clearly M is
measurable. This shows that (a) implies (b).
The fact that (b) implies (c) is immediate, since if Ek+1ϕ logically implies BiEkϕ, which in turn
logically implies 〈Bi〉iEkϕ for all k and all formulas ϕ. The fact that (c) implies (d) is also immediate.
Finally, to see that (d) implies (a), suppose that M is a structure appropriate for Γ and ω is a state in
M such that si(ω) = σ and (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉EkRAT for all k ≥ 0. For each player j, define the formulas
Ck inductively by taking C0j to be true and C
k+1
j to be RAT j∧Bj(∧j′ 6=jCkj′). An easy induction shows
that for k > 1, Ckj is equivalent to RAT j ∧ Bj(E0RAT ∧ . . . ∧ Ek−2RAT ) in appropriate structures.
Define Xkj = {sj(ω′) : (M,ω′) |= Ckj }. If σ′ ∈ Xkj for k ≥ 1, choose some state ω′ such that
(M,ω′) |= RAT j ∧ BjE
k−2RAT and sj(ω′) = σ′, and define µσ′,k to be the projection of PRj(ω′)
onto Σ−j . It easily follows that the support of µσ′,k isXk−1−j and that σ′ is a best response with respect to
µσ,k. Finally, since (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉EkRAT for all k ≥ 0, it easily follows that σ = si(ω) ∈ ∩∞k=0Xki .
Thus, by Definition 2.2, σ is rationalizable′ and, by Proposition 2.3, σ is rationalizable.
We now characterize iterated deletion of strongly dominated (resp., weakly dominated) strategies.
Definition 2.5: Strategy σ for player is i strongly dominated by σ′ with respect to Σ′−i ⊆ Σ−i if
ui(σ, τ−i) > ui(σ, τ−i) for all τ−i ∈ Σ′−i. Strategy σ for player is i weakly dominated by σ′ with
respect to Σ′−i ⊆ Σ−i if ui(σ, τ−i) ≥ ui(σ, τ−i) for all τ−i ∈ Σ′−i and ui(σ, τ ′−i) > ui(σ, τ ′−i) for some
τ ′−i ∈ Σ
′
−i.
Strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of strongly dominated (resp., weakly
dominated) strategies if, for each player j, there exists a sequence X0j ,X1j ,X2j , . . . ,Xkj of sets of strate-
gies for player j such that X0j = Σj and, if h < k, then X
h+1
j consists of the strategies in Xhj not
strongly (resp., weakly) dominated by any strategy with respect to Xh−j , and σ ∈ Xki . Strategy σ sur-
vives iterated deletion of strongly dominated (resp., weakly dominated) strategies if it survives k rounds
of iterated deletion for all k.
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The following well-known result connects strong and weak dominance to best responses.
Proposition 2.6: [Pearce 1984]
• A strategy σ for player i is not strongly dominated by any strategy with respect to Σ′−i iff there is
a belief µσ of player i whose support is a subset of Σ′−i such that σ is a best response with respect
to µσ.
• A strategy σ for player i is not weakly dominated by any strategy with respect to Σ′−i iff there is a
belief µσ of player i whose support is all of Σ′−i such that σ is a best response with respect to µσ.
It immediately follows from Propositions 2.3 and 2.6 (and is well known) that a strategy is ratio-
nalizable iff it survives iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. Thus, the characterization
of rationalizability in Theorem 2.4 is also a characterization of strategies that survive iterated deletion
of strongly dominated strategies. To characterize iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, we
need to enrich the langauge Ł1 somewhat. Let Ł2(Γ) be the extension of Ł1 that includes a primitive
proposition play i(σ) for each player i and strategy σ ∈ Σi, and is also closed off under the modal
operator ♦. We omit the parenthetical Γ when it is clear from context. We extend the truth relation to
Ł2 in probability structures appropriate for Γ as follows:
• (M,ω) |= play i(σ) iff ω ∈ [[σ]]M .
• (M,ω) |= ♦ϕ iff there is some structure M ′ appropriate for Γ and state ω′ such that (M ′, ω′) |= ϕ.
Intuitively, ♦ϕ is true if there is some state and structure where ϕ is true; that is, if ϕi is satisfiable. Note
that if ♦ϕ is true at some state, then it is true at all states in all structures.
Let play(~σ) be an abbreviation for ∧nj=1 play j(σj), and let play−i(σ−i) be an abbrevation for
∧j 6=iplay j(σj). Intuitively, (M,ω) |= play(~σ) iff s(ω) = σ, and (M,ω) |= play−i(σ−i) if, at ω,
the players other than i are playing strategy profile σ−i. Define the formulas Dkj inductively by taking
D0j to be the formula true, and D
k+1
j to be an abbreviation of
RAT j ∧Bj(∧j′ 6=jD
k
j′) ∧ (∧σ−j∈Σ−j♦(play−j(σ−j) ∧ (∧j′ 6=jD
k
j′))⇒ 〈Bj〉(play−j(σ−j)).
It is easy to see that Dkj implies the formula Ckj defined in the proof of Theorem 2.4, and hence
implies RAT j ∧ Bj(E0RAT ∧ . . . ∧ Ek−2RAT ). But Dkj requires more; it requires that player j
assign positive probability to each strategy profile for the other players that is compatible with Dk−1−j .
Theorem 2.7: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies;
(b) for all k′ ≤ k, there is a measurable structure Mk′ appropriate for Γ and a state ωk′ in Mk′ such
that si(ωk
′
) = σ and (Mk′ , ωk′) |= Dk′i ;
(c) for all k′ ≤ k, there is a structure Mk′ appropriate for Γ and a state ωk′ in Mk′ such that
si(ω
k′) = σ and (Mk′ , ωk′) |= Dk′i .
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In addition, there is a finite structure Mk = (Ωk, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn) such that Ωk = {(k′, i, ~σ) :
k′ ≤ k, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ~σ ∈ Xk
′
1 ×· · ·×X
k′
n }, s(k
′, i, ~σ) = ~σ, F = 2Ω
k
, where Xk′j consists of all strategies
for player j that survive k′ rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies and, for all states
(k′, i, ~σ) ∈ Ωk, (M
k
, (k′, i, ~σ)) |= ∧j 6=iD
k′
j .
Proof: We proceed by induction on k, proving both the equivalence of (a), (b), and (c) and the existence
of a structure Mk with the required properties.
The result clearly holds if k = 0. Suppose that the result holds for k; we show that it holds for
k + 1. We first show that (c) implies (a). Suppose that (Mk′ , ωk′) |= Dk′j and sj(ωk
′
) = σj for all
k′ ≤ k+1. It follows that σj is a best response to the belief µσj on the strategies of other players induced
by PRk+1j (ω). Since (Mk+1, ωk+1) |= Bj(∧j′ 6=jDkj′), it follows from the induction hypothesis that
the support of µσj is contained in Xk−j . Since (M,ω) |= ∧σ−j∈Σ−j (♦(play−j(σ−j) ∧ (∧j 6=iDkj )) ⇒
〈Bj〉(play−j(σ−j))), it follows from the induction hypothesis that the support of µσj is all of Xk−j .
Since (Mk′ , ωk′) |= Dk′j for k′ ≤ k, it follows from the induction hypothesis that σj ∈ Xkj . Thus,
σj ∈ X
k+1
j .
We next construct the structure Mk+1 = (Ωk+1, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn). As required, we define
Ωk+1 = {(k′, i, ~σ) : k′ ≤ k + 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ~σ ∈ Xk
′
1 × · · · ×X
k′
n }, s(k
′, i, ~σ) = ~σ, F = 2Ω
k+1
. For a
state ω of the form (k′, i, ~σ), since σj ∈ Xk
′
j , by Proposition 2.6, there exists a distribution µk′,σj whose
support is all of Xk−1−j such that σj is a best response to µσj . Extend µk′,σj to a distribution µ′k′,i,σj on
Ωk+1 as follows:
• for i 6= j, let µ′k′,i,σj(k
′′, i′, ~τ) = µk′,σj(~τ−j) if i′ = j, k′′ = k′−1, and τj = σj , and 0 otherwise;
• µ′k′,j,σj(k
′′, i′, ~τ) = µk′,σj (~τ−j) if i′ = j, k′′ = k′, and τj = σj , and 0 otherwise.
Let PRj(k′, i, ~σ) = σ′k′,i,σj . We leave it to the reader to check that this structure is appropriate. An
easy induction on k′ now shows that (Mk+1, (k′, i, ~σ)) |= ∧j 6=iDk
′
j for i = 1, . . . , n.
To see that (a) implies (b), suppose that σj ∈ Xk+1j . Choose a state ω in M
k+1
of the form
(k + 1, i, ~σ), where i 6= j. As we just showed, (Mk+1, (k′, i, ~σ) |= Dk′j , and sj(k′, i, ~σ) = σj .
Moreover, Mk+1 is measurable (since F consists of all subsets of Ωk+1).
Clearly (b) implies (c).
Corollary 2.8: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies;
(b) there is a measurable structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ
and (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉Dki for all k ≥ 0;
(c) there is a structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ and (M,ω) |=
〈Bi〉D
k
i for all k ≥ 0.
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Note that there is no analogue of Theorem 2.4(b) here. This is because there is no state where Dki
holds for all k ≥ 0; it cannot be the case that i places positive probability on all strategies (as required by
Dk1 ) and that i places positive probability only on strategies that survive one round of iterated deletion
(as required by Dk2 ), unless all strategies survive one round on iterated deletion. We can say something
slightly weaker though. There is some k such that the process of iterated deletion converges; that is,
Xkj = X
k+1
j for all j (and hence Xkj = Xk
′
j for all k′ ≥ k). That means that there is a state where
Dk
′
i holds for all k′ > k. Thus, we can show that a strategy σ for player i survives iterated deletion of
weakly dominated strategies iff there exists a k and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ and (M,ω) |= Dk
′
i for
all k′ > k. Since Ck+1i implies Cki , an anlagous results holds for iterated deletion of strongly dominated
strategies, with Dk′i replaced by Ck
′
i .
It is also worth noting that in a state where Dk holds, an agent does not consider all strategies
possible, but only the ones consistent with the appropriate level of rationality. We could require the
agent to consider all strategies possible by using LPS’s or nonstandard probability. The only change
that this would make to our characterization is that, if we are using nonstandard probability, we would
interpret Biϕ to mean that ϕ holds with probability infinitesimally close to 1, while 〈Bi〉ϕ would mean
that ϕ holds with probability whose standard part is positive (i.e., non-infinitesimal probability). We do
not pursue this point further.
3 Strong Admissibility
We have formalized iterated admissibility by saying that an agent consider possible all strategies consis-
tent with the appropriate rationality assumption. But why focus just on strategies? We now consider a
stronger admissibility requirement that we call, not surprisingly, strong admissibility. Here we require,
intuitively, that all an agent knows about the other agents is that they satisfy the appropriate rationality
assumptions. Thus, the agent ascribes positive probability to all beliefs that the other agents could have
as well as all the strategies they could be using. By considering strong admissibility, we will be able to
relate work on “all I know” [Halpern and Lakemeyer 2001; Levesque 1990], BFK’s notion of complete
structures, and admisibility.
Roughly speaking, we interpret “all agent i knows is ϕ” as meaning that agent i believes ϕ, and
considers possible every formula about the other players’ strategies and beliefs consistent with ϕ. Thus,
what “all I know” means is very sensitive to the choice of language. Let Ł0 be the language whose
only formulas are (Boolean combinations of) formulas of the form play i(σ), i = 1, . . . , n, σ ∈ Σi.
Let Ł0i consist of just the formulas of the form play i(σ), and let Ł0−i = ∪j 6=iŁ0j . Define O−i ϕ to be
an abbreviation for Biϕ ∧ (∧ψ∈Ł0
−i
♦(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ 〈Bi〉ψ). Then it is easy to see that Dk+1j is just
RAT j ∧O
−
j (∧j′ 6=jD
k
j′).
We can think of O−i ϕ as saying “all agent i knows with respect to the language Ł0 is ϕ.” The
language Ł0 is quite weak. To relate our results to those of BFK, even the language Ł2 is too weak,
since it does not allow an agent to express probabilistic beliefs. Let Ł3(Γ) be the language that extends
Ł2(Γ) by allowing formulas of the form pr i(ϕ) ≥ α and pr i(ϕ) > α, where α is a rational number
in [0, 1]; pr i(ϕ) ≥ α can be read as “the probability of ϕ according to i is at least α”, and similarly
for pr i(ϕ) > α. We allow nesting here, so that we can have a formula of the form pr j(play i(σ) ∧
prk(play i(σ
′)) > 1/3) ≥ 1/4. As we would expect,
• (M,ω) |= pr i(ϕ) iff PRi(ω)([[ϕ]]M ) ≥ α.
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The restriction to α being rational allows the language to be countable. However, as we now show, it is
not too serious a restriction.
Let Ł4(Γ) be the language that extends Ł2(Γ) by closing off under countable conjunctions, so that
if ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . are formulas, then so is ∧∞m=1ϕm, and formulas of the form pr i(ϕ) > α, where α is a real
number in [0, 1]. (We can express pr i(ϕ) ≥ α as the countable conjunction ∧β<α,β∈Q∩[0,1]pr i(ϕ) > β,
where Q is the set of rational numbers, so there is no need to include formulas of the form pr i(ϕ) ≥ α
explicitly in Ł4(Γ).) We omit the parenthetical Γ in Ł3(Γ) and Ł4(Γ) when the game Γ is clear from
context. A subset Φ of Ł3 is Ł3-realizable if there exists an appropriate structure M for Γ and state ω in
M such that, for all formulas ϕ ∈ Ł3, (M,ω) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Φ.1 We can similarly define what it means
for a subset of Ł4 to be Ł4-realizable.
Lemma 3.1: Every Ł3-realizable set can be uniquely extended to an Ł4-realizable set.
Proof: It is easy to see that every Ł3-realizable set can be extended to an Ł4-realizable set. For suppose
that Φ is Ł3-realizable. Then there is some state ω and structure M such that, for every formula ϕ ∈ Ł3,
we have that (M,ω) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Φ. Let Φ′ consist of the Ł4 formulas true at ω. Then clearly Φ′ is an
Ł4-realizable set that extends Φ.
To show that the extension is unique, suppose that there are two Ł4-realizable sets, say Φ1 and Φ2,
that extend Φ. We want to show that Φ1 = Φ2. To do this, we consider two language, Ł5 and Ł6,
intermediate between Ł3 and Ł4.
Let Ł5 be the language that extends Ł2 by closing off under countable conjunctions and formulas
of the form pr i(ϕ) > α, where α is a rational number in [0, 1]. Thus, in Ł5, we have countable
conjunctions and disjunctions, but can talk explicitly only about rational probabilities. Nevertheless, it
is easy to see that for every formula ϕ ∈ Ł4, there is an formula equivalent formula ϕ′ ∈ Ł5, since if α
is a real number, then pr i(ϕ) > α is equivalent to ∨β>α, β∈[0,1]∩Q pr i(ϕ) > β (an infinite disjunction
∨∞i=1ϕi can be viewed as an abbreviation for ¬ ∧∞i=1 ¬ϕi).
Next, let Ł6 be the result of closing off formulas in Ł3 under countable conjunction and disjunction.
Thus, in Ł6, we can apply countable conjunction and disjunction only at the outermost level, not inside
the scope of pr i. We claim that for every formula ϕ ∈ Ł5, there is an equivalent formula in Ł6.
More precisely, for every formula ϕ ∈ Ł5, there exist formulas ϕij ∈ Ł3, 1 ≤ i, j < ∞ such that ϕ is
equivalent to ∧∞m=1∨∞n=1ϕmn. We prove this by induction on the structure of ϕ. If ϕ is RAT i, play i(σ),
or true, then the statement is clearly true. The result is immediate from the induction hypothesis if ϕ
is a countable conjunction. If ϕ has the form ¬ϕ′, we apply the induction hypothesis, and observe
that ¬(∧∞m=1 ∨∞n=1 ϕmn) is equivalent to ∨∞m=1 ∧∞n=1 ¬ϕmn. We can convert this to a conjunction of
disjunctions by distributing the disjunctions over the conjunctions in the standard way (just as (E1 ∩
E2) ∪ (E3 ∩ E4) is equivalent to (E1 ∪ E3) ∩ (E1 ∪ E4) ∩ (E2 ∪ E3) ∩ (E2 ∪ E4)). Finally, if ϕ has
the form pr i(ϕ′) > α, we apply the induction hypothesis, and observe that pr i(∧∞m=1 ∨∞n=1 ϕmn) > α
is equivalent to
∨α′>α,α′∈Q∩[0,1] ∧
∞
M=1 ∨
∞
N=1pr i(∧
M
m=1 ∨
N
n=1 ϕmn) > α
′.
The desired result follows, since if two states agree on all formulas in Ł3, they must agree on all
formulas in Ł6, and hence on all formulas in Ł5 and Ł4.
1For readers familiar with standard completeness proofs in modal logic, if we had axiomatized the logic we are implicitly
using here, the Ł3-realizable sets would just be the maximal consistent sets in the logic.
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The choice of language turns out to be significant for a number of our results; we return to this issue
at various points below.
With this background, we can define strong admissibility. Let Ł3i consist of all formulas in Ł3 of
the form pr i(ϕ) ≥ α and pr i(ϕ) > α (ϕ can mention pr i; it is only the outermost modal operator that
must be i). Intuitively, Ł3i consists of the formulas describing i’s beliefs. Let Ł3i+ consist of Ł3i together
with formulas of the form true, RAT i, and play i(σ), for σ ∈ Σi. Let Ł3(−i)+ be an abbreviation for
∪j 6=iŁ3j+. We can similarly define Ł4i and Ł4i+.
If ϕ ∈ Ł3(−i)+, define Oiϕ, read “all agent i knows (with respect to Ł3) is ϕ,” as an abbreviation for
the Ł4 formula
Biϕ ∧ (∧ψ∈Ł3(−i)+♦(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ 〈Bj〉ψ).
Thus, Oiϕ holds if agent i believes ϕ but does not know anything beyond that; he ascribes positive
probability to all formulas in Ł3(−i)+ consistent with ϕ. This is very much in the spirit of the Halpern-
Lakemeyer [2001] definition of Oi in the context of epistemic logic.
Of course, we could go further and define a notion of “all i knows” for the language Ł4. Doing
this would give a definition that is even closer to that of Halpern and Lakemeyer. Unfortunately, we
cannot require than agent i ascribe positive probability to all the formulas in Ł4(−i)+ consistent with ϕ;
in general, there will be an uncountable number of distinct and mutually exclusive formulas consistent
with ϕ, so they cannot all be assigned positive probability. This problem does not arise with Ł3, since
it is a countable language. Halpern and Lakemeyer could allow an agent to consider an uncountable set
of worlds possible, since they were not dealing with probabilistic systems. This stresses the point that
the notion of “all I know” is quite sensitive to the choice of language.
Define the formulas F ki inductively by taking F 0i to be the formula true, and F
k+1
i to an abbreviation
of RAT i ∧ Oi(∧j 6=iF kj ). Thus, F
k+1
j says that i is rational, believes that all the other players satisfy
level-k rationality (i.e., F kj ), and that is all that i knows. An easy induction shows that F k+1j implies
that j is rational and j believes that everyone believes (k times) that everyone is rational. Moreover, it is
easy to see that F k+1j implies D
k+1
j . The difference is that instead of requiring just that j assign positive
probability to all strategy profiles compatible with F k−j , it requires that j assign positive probability to
all formulas compatible with F k−j .
A strategy σi for player i is kth-level strongly admissible if it is consistent with F ki ; that is, if
play i(σi) ∧ F
k
i is satisfied in some state. The next result shows that strong admissibility characterizes
iterated deletion, just as admissibility does.
Theorem 3.2: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies;
(b) for all k′ ≤ k, there is a measurable structure Mk′ appropriate for Γ and a state ωk′ in Mk′ such
that si(ωk
′
) = σ and (Mk′ , ωk′) |= F k′i ;
(c) for all k′ ≤ k, there is a structure Mk′ appropriate for Γ and a state ωk′ in Mk′ such that
si(ω
k′) = σ and (Mk′ , ωk′) |= F k′i ;
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Proof: The proof is similar in spirit to the proof of Theorem 2.7. We again proceed by induction on k.
The result clearly holds for k = 0. If k = 1, the proof that (c) implies (a) is essentially identical to that
of Theorem 2.7; we do not repeat it here.
To prove that (a) implies (b), we need the following three lemmas; the first shows that a formula is
always satisfied in a state that has probability 0; the second shows that that we can get a new structure
with a world where agent i ascribes positive probability to each of a countable collection of satisfiable
formulas in Ł3−i; and the third shows that formulas in Ł4i+ for different players i are independent; that
is, if ϕi ∈ Ł4i+ is satisfiable, then so is ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn.
Lemma 3.3: If ϕ ∈ Ł4 is satisfiable in a measurable structure, then there exists a measurable structure
M and state ω such that (M,ω) |= ϕ, {ω} is measurable, PRj(ω)({ω}) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n.
Proof: Suppose that (M ′, ω′) |= ϕ, where M ′ = (Ω′, s′,F ′,PR′1, . . . ,PR′n). Let Ω = Ω′ ∪
{ω}, where where ω is a fresh state; let F be the smallest σ-algebra that contains F and {ω}; let s
and PRj agree with s′ and PR′j when restricted to states in Ω′ (more precisely, if ω′′ ∈ Ω′, then
PRj(ω
′′)(A) = PR′j(ω
′′)(A ∩ Ω′) for j = 1, . . . , n). Finally, define si(ω) = si(ω′), and take
PRj(ω)(A) = PR
′
j(ω
′)(A∩Ω′) for j = 1, . . . , n. Clearly {ω} is measurable, and PRj(ω)({ω}) = 0
for j = 1, . . . , n. An easy induction on structure shows that for all formulas ψ, (a) (M,ω) |= ψ iff
(M,ω′) |= ψ, and (b) for all states ω′′ ∈ Ω′, we have that (M,ω′′) |= ψ iff (M ′, ω′′) |= ψ. It follows
that (M,ω) |= ϕ, and that M is measurable.
Lemma 3.4: Suppose that ~σ ∈ ~Σ, Φ′ is a countable collection of formulas in Ł4−i, ϕ ∈ Ł4−i, and Σ′−i
is a set of strategy profiles in Σ−i such that (a) for each formula ϕ′ ∈ Φ′, there exists some profile
σ−i ∈ Σ
′
−i such that ϕ∧ϕ′∧play−i(σ−i) is satisfied in a measurable structure, and (b) for each profile
σ−i ∈ Σ
′
−i, play−i(σ−i) is one of the formulas in Φ′. Then there exists a measurable structure M and
state ω such that s(ω) = ~σ, (M,ω) |= play−j(σ−i) ≥ α iff µj(σ−i) ≥ α (that is, µ−i agrees with
PRi(ω) when marginalized to strategy profiles in Σ′−i), and (M,ω) |= Biϕ ∧ 〈Bi〉ϕ′ for all ϕ′ ∈ Φ′.
Proof: Let Φ′ and Σ′−i be as in the statement of the lemma. Suppose that Φ′ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , . . .}. By
assumption, for each formula ϕk ∈ Φ′, there exists some strategy profile σ′−i ∈ Σ′−i, measurable struc-
ture Mk = (Ωk, sk,Fk,PRk1 , . . . ,PR
k
n), and ωk ∈ Ωk such that (Mk, ωk) |= ϕ ∧ ϕk ∧ play−i(σ′−i),
for k = 1, 2, . . .. By Lemma 3.3, we can assume without loss of generality that {ωk} ∈ Fk and
PRkj (ω
k)({ωi}) = 0. Define M∞ = (Ω∞, s∞,F∞,PR∞1 , . . . ,PR∞n ) as follows:
• Ω∞ = ∪∞k=0Ω
k ∪ {ω}, where ω is a fresh state;
• F∞ is the smallest σ-algebra that contains {ω} ∪ F1 ∪ F2 ∪ . . .;
• s∞ agrees with PRkj when restricted to states in Ωk, except that s∞i (ωk) = σi and s∞(ω) = ~σ;
• PR∞j agrees with PRkj when restricted to states in Ωk (more precisely, if ω′ ∈ Ωk, then
PR∞j (ω
′)(A) = PRkj (ω
′)(A∩Ωk), except thatPR∞i (ω) = PR∞i (ω1) = PRi(ω2) = · · · is de-
fined to be a distribution with support {ω1, ω2, . . .} (so that all these states are given positive prob-
ability) such that PR∞i (ω) agrees µ when marginalized to profiles in Σ−i, and PR∞j (ω)({ω}) =
1 for j 6= i. It is easy to see that our assumptions guarantee that this can be done.
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We can now prove by a straightforward induction on the structure of ψ that (a) for all formulas ψ,
k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., and states ω′ ∈ Ωk − {ωk}, we have that (Mk, ω′) |= ψ iff (M∞, ω′) |= ψ; and
(b) for all formulas ψ ∈ Ł4(−i)+ , k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., and (Mk, ωk) |= ψ iff (M∞, ωk) |= ψ. (Here it is
important that PR∞j (ωk) = PRkj (ω) = 0 for j 6= i; this ensures that j’s beliefs about i’s strategies and
beliefs unaffected by the fact that ski (ωk) 6= s∞i (ωk) and PRki (ωk) 6= PR∞i (ωk).) It easily follows
that (M∞, ω) |= Biϕ ∧ 〈Bi〉ϕ′ for all ϕ′ ∈ Φ′.
Lemma 3.5: If ϕi ∈ Ł4i+ is satisfiable for i = 1, . . . , n, then ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn is satisfiable.
Proof: Suppose that (M i, ωi) |= ϕi, where M i = (Ωi, si,F i,PRi1, . . . ,PRin) and ϕi ∈ Ł4i+. By
Lemma 3.3, we again assume without loss of generality that {ωi} ∈ F i and PRj(ωi)({ωi}) = 0. Let
M∗ = (Ω∗, s∗,F∗,PR∗1, . . . ,PR
∗
n), where
• Ω∗ = ∪ni=1Ω
i;
• F∗ is the smallest σ-algebra containing F1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fn;
• s∗ agrees with sj on states in Ωj except that s∗i (ωj) = sii(ωi) (so that s∗(ω1) = · · · = s∗(ωn));
• PR∗i agrees with PR
j
i on states in Ωj except that PR
∗
i (ω
j) = PRii(ω
i) (so that PR∗i (ω1) =
· · · = PR∗i (ω
n) = PRii(ω
i)).
We can now prove by induction on the structure of ψ that (a) for all formulas ψ, i = 1, . . . , n,
and states ω′ ∈ Ωi, we have that (M i, ω′) |= ψ iff (M∗, ω′) |= ψ; (b) for all formulas ψ ∈ Ł4i+,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, (M i, ωi) |= ψ iff (M∗, ωj) |= ψ (again, here it is important that PR∗i (ωj) = 0 for
j = 1, . . . , n). Note that part (b) implies that the states ω1, . . . , ωn satisfy the same formulas in M∗. It
easily follows that (M∗, ωi) |= ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn for i = 1, . . . , n.
We can now prove the theorem. Again, let Xkj be the strategies for player j that survive k rounds of
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. To see that (a) implies (b), suppose that σi ∈ Xk+1i .
By Proposition 2.6, there exists a distribution µi whose support is Xk−i such that σi is a best response
to µi. By the induction hypothesis, for each strategy profile τ−i ∈ Xk−i, and all j 6= i, the formula
play j(τj) ∧ F
0
j is satisfied in a measurable structure. By Lemma 3.5, play−j(τ−j) ∧ (∧j 6=iF kj ) is
satisfied in a measurable structure. Taking ϕ to be ∧j 6=iF kj , by Lemma 3.4, there exists a measurable
structure M and state ω inM such that the marginal of PRi(ω) onXk−i is µi, si(ω) is σi, and (M,ω) |=
Bi(∧j 6=iF
k
j ) ∧ (∧ψ∈Ł3(−j)+♦(ψ ∧ (∧j 6=iF
k
j )) ⇒ 〈Bj〉ψ). It follows that (M,ω) |= RAT i, and hence
that (M,ω) |= F k+1i , as desired.
It is immediate that (b) implies (c).
Corollary 3.6: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies;
(b) there is a measurable structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ
and (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉F ki for all k ≥ 0;
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(c) there is a structure M that is appropriate for Γ and a state ω such that si(ω) = σ and (M,ω) |=
〈Bi〉F
k
i for all k ≥ 0.
Proof: The proof is essentially identical to that of Corollary 2.8, so is omitted here.
4 Complete and Canonical Structures
4.1 Canonical Structures
Intuitively, to check whether a formula is strongly admissible, and, more generally, to check if all agent
i knows is ϕ, we want to start with a very rich structure M that contains all possible consistent sets of
formulas, so that if ϕ ∧ ψ is satisfied at all, it is satisfied in that structure. Motivated by this intuition,
Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] worked in the canonical structure for their language, which contains a
state corresponding to every consistet set of formulas. We do the same thing here.
Define the canonical structure M c = (Ωc, sc,Fc,PRc1, . . . ,PRcn) for Ł4 as follows:
• Ωc = {ωΦ : Φ is a realizable subset of Ł4(Γ};
• sc(ωΦ) = ~σ iff play(σ) ∈ Φ;
• Fc = {Fϕ : ϕ ∈ Ł4}, where Fϕ = {ωΦ : ϕ ∈ Φ};
• Prci(ωΦ)(Fϕ) = inf{α : pr i(ϕ) > α ∈ Φ}.
Lemma 4.1: M c is an appropriate measurable structure for Γ.
Proof: It is easy to see that Fc is a σ-algebra, since the complement of Fϕ is F¬ϕ and ∩∞m=1Fϕi =
F∧∞m=1ϕm . Given a strategy σ for player i, [[σ]]Mc = Fplay i(σ) ∈ F . Moreover, each realizable
set Φ that includes play i(σ) must also include pr i(play i(σ)) = 1, so that PRi(ωΦ)(si(ωΦ)) =
PRi(ωΦ)(Fplay i(si(ωΦ)) = 1. Similarly, suppose that PRi(ωΦ) = π. Then {ω ∈ Ω
c : PRi(ω) =
π} = ∩
ϕ∈Ł3 ∩{α∈Q∩[0,1]:pi([[ϕ]]Mc)≥α} Fϕ≥α ∈ F
c
. Moreover, if α ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], then π([[ϕ]]Mc) ≥ α
iff pr i(ϕ) ≥ α ∈ Φ. But if pr i(ϕ) ≥ α ∈ Φ, then pr i(pr i(ϕ) ≥ α) = 1 ∈ Φ. It easily follows that
PRi(ωΦ)({ω : PRi(ω) = π}) = 1. Finally, the definition of Fc guarantees that every set [[ϕ]]Mc is
measurable and that PRi(ωΦ) is indeed a probability distribution on (Ωc,Fc).
The following result is the analogue of the standard “truth lemma” in completeness proofs in modal
logic.
Proposition 4.2: For ψ ∈ Ł4, (M c, ωΦ) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ Φ.
Proof: A straightforward induction on the structure of ψ.
We have constructed a canonical structure for Ł4. It follows easily from Lemma 3.1 that the canon-
ical structure for Ł3 (where the states are realizable Ł3 sets) is isomorphic to M c. (In this case, the set
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Fc of measurable sets would be the smallest σ-algebra containing [[ϕ]]M for ϕ ∈ Ł3.) Thus, the choice
of Ł3 vs. Ł4 does not play an important role when constructing a canonical structure.
A strategy σi for player i survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies iff the Ł4 formula
undominated (σi) = play i(σi)∧(∧
∞
k=1〈Bi〉F
k
i ) is satisfied at some state in the canonical structure. But
there are other structures in which undominated(σi) is satisfied. One way to get such a struture is by
essentially “duplicating” states in the canonical structure. The canonical structure can be embedded
in a structure M if, for all Ł3-realizable sets Φ, there is a state ωΦ in M such that (M,ωΦ) |= ϕ iff
ϕ ∈ Φ. Clearly undominated (σi) is satisfied in any structure in which the canonical structure can be
embedded.
A structure in which the canonical structure can be embedded is in a sense larger than the canonical
structure. But undominated (σi) can be satisfied in structures smaller than the canonical structure.
(Indeed, with some effort, we can show that it is satisfiable in a structure with countably many states.)
There are two reasons for this. The first is that to satisfy undominated (σi), there is no need to consider
a structure with states where all the players are irrational. It suffices to restrict to states where at least
one player is using a strategy that survives at least one round of iterated deletion. This is because players
know their strategy; thus, in a state where a strategy σj for player j is admissible, player j must ascribe
positive probability to all other strategies; however, in those states, player j still plays σj .
A perhaps more interesting reason that we do not need the canonical structure is our use of the lan-
guage Ł3. Strong admissibility guarantees that player j will ascribe positive probability to all formulas
ϕ consistent with rationality. Since a finite conjunction of formulas in Ł3 is also a formula in Ł3, player
j will ascribe positive probability to all finite conjunctions of formulas consistent with rationality. But
a state is characterized by a countable conjunction of formulas. Since Ł3 is not closed under count-
able conjunctions, a structure that satisfies undominated (σi) may not have states corresponding to all
L3-realizable sets of formulas. If we had used Ł4 instead of Ł3 in the definition of strong admissibility
(ignoring the issues raised earlier with using Ł4), then there would be a state corresponding to every
Ł4-realizable (equivalently, Ł3-realizable) set of formulas. Alternatively, if we consider appropriate
structures that are compact in a topology where all sets definable by formulas (i.e., sets of the form
[[ϕ]]M , for ϕ ∈ Ł3) are closed (in which case they are also open, since [[¬ϕ]]M is the complement of
[[ϕ]]M ), then all states where at least one player is using a strategy that survives at least one round of
iterated deletion will be in the structure.
Although, as this discussion makes clear, the formula that characterizes strong admissibility can be
satisfied in structures quite different from the canonical structure, the canonical structure does seem to
be the most appropriate setting for reasoning about statements involving “all agent i knows”, which is
at the heart of strong admissibility. Moreover, as we now show, canonical structures allow us to relate
our approach to that of BFK.
4.2 Complete Structures
BFK worked with complete structures. We now want to show that M c is complete, in the sense of BFK.
To make this precise, we need to recall some notions from BFK (with some minor changes to be more
consistent with our notation).
BFK considered what they called interactive probability structures. These can be viewed as a special
case of probability structures. A BFK-like structure (for a game Γ) is a probability structure M =
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(Ω, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn) such that there exist spaces T1, . . . , Tn (where Ti can be thought of as the
type space for player i) such that
• Ω is isomorphic to ~Σ× ~T , via some isomorphism h;
• if h(ω) = ~σ × ~t, then
– s(ω) = ~σ,
– taking Ti(ω) = ti (i.e., the type of player i in h(ω) is ti); the support ofPRi(ω) is contained
in {ω′ : si(ω′) = σ′, Ti(ω′) = ti}, so that PRi(ω) induces a probability on Σ−i × T−i;
– PRi(ω) depends only on Ti(ω), in the sense that if Ti(ω) = Ti(ω′), then PRi(ω) and
PRi(ω
′) induce the same probability distribution on Σ−i × T−i.
A BFK-like structure M whose state space is isomorphic to ~Σ× ~T is complete if, for every for each
distribution µi over Σ−i×T−i, there is a state ω inM such that the probability distribution on Σ−i×T−i
induced by PRi(ω) is µi.
Proposition 4.3: M c is complete BFK-like structure.
Proof: A set Φ ⊆ Ł3i is Ł3i -realizable if there exists an appropriate structure M for Γ and state ω in
M such that, for all formulas ϕ ∈ Ł3, (M,ω) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Φ. Take the type space Ti to consist of all
Ł3i -realizable sets of formulas. There is an isomorphism h between Ωc and ~Σ × ~T , where Ti(ω) is the
i-realizable type of formulas of the form pr i(ϕ) ≥ α that are true at ω; that is, h(ω) = s(ω)× T1(ω)×
· · · ×Tn(ω). It follows easily from Lemma 3.5 that h is a surjection. we can identify Ωc, the state space
in the canonical structure, with ~Σ× ~T .
To prove that M c is complete, given a probability µ on Σ−i × T−i, we must show that there is
some state ω in M c such that the probability induced by PRi(ω) on Σ−i × T−i is µ. Let Mµ =
(Ωsigma,µ,Fµ, sµ,PRµ1 , . . . ,PR
µ
n), where Mµ are defined as follows:
• Ωµ = Ωc ∪ Σ× {µ} × T−i;
• Fµ is the smallest σ-algebra that contains Fc and all sets of the form ~σ × {µ} × [[ϕ]]′Mc , and
[[ϕ]]′Mc consists of the all type profiles t−i such that, for some state ω in M c, (M c, ϕ) |= ϕ and
T−i(ϕ) = t−i;
• sµ(ω) = sc(ω) for ω ∈ Ωc, and sµ(~σ × {µ} × ~t) = ~σ;
• PRµj (ω) = PR
c
j(ω) for ω ∈ Ωc, j = 1, . . . , n; for j 6= i, PR
µ
j (~σ × µ× t−i) = PRj(ω), where
sj(ω) = σj and Tj(ω) = tj (this is well defined, since if sj(ω′) = σj and Tj(ω′) = tj , then
PRj(ω) = PRj(ω
′); finally, PRµi (~σ × µ × t−i) is a distribution whose support is contained in
{σi} ×Σ−i × {µ} × T−i, and PRµi (~σ × µ× t−i)(~σ × µ× [[ϕ]]′Mc) = µ([[ϕ]]′Mc).
Choose an arbitrary state ω ∈ ~Σ× {µ} × T−i. The construction of Mµ guarantees that for ϕ ∈ Ł4(−i)+,
(Mµ, ω) |= pr i(ϕ) > α iff µ([[ϕ]]′Mc) > α. By the construction of M c, there exists a state ω′ ∈ Ωc
such that (M c, ω′) |= ψ iff (Mµ, ω) |= ψ. Thus, the distribution on Σ−i × T−i induced by PRi(ω) is
µ, as desired. This shows that M c is complete.
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We now would like to show that every measurable complete BFK-like structure is the canonical
model. This is not quite true because states can be duplicated in an interactive structure. This suggests
that we should try to show that the canonical structure can be embedded in every measurable complete
structure. We can essentially show this, except that we need to restrict to strongly measurable complete
structures, where a structure is strongly measurable if it is measurable and the only measurable sets are
those defined by Ł4 formulas (or, equivalently, the set of measurable sets is the smallest set that contains
the sets defined by Ł3 formulas). We explain where strong measurability is needed at the end of the
proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4: If M is a strongly measurable complete BFK-like structure, then the canonical structure
can be embedded in M .
Proof: Suppose that M is a strongly measurable complete BFK-like structure. We can assume without
loss of generality that the state space of M has the form ~Σ × ~T . To prove the result, we need the
following lemmas.
Lemma 4.5: If M is BFK-like, the truth of a formula ϕ ∈ Ł4i at a state ω in M depends only on i’s type;
That is, if Ti(ω) = Ti(ω′), then (M,ω) |= ϕ iff (M,ω′) |= ϕ. Similarly, the truth of a formula in Łi+ in
ω depends only on si(ω) and Ti(ω), and the truth of a formula in Ł4i+ in ω depends only on T−i(ω).
Proof: A straightforward induction on structure.
Define a basic formula to be one of the form ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn, where ψi ∈ Ł3i+ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 4.6: Every formula in Ł3 is equivalent to a finite disjunction of basic formulas.
Proof: A straightforward induction on structure.
Lemma 4.7: Every formula in Ł3i+ is equivalent to a disjunction of formulas of the form
play i(σ)∧(¬)RATi∧(¬)pr i(ϕ1) > α1∧. . .∧(¬)pr i(ϕm) > αm∧(¬)pr i(ψ1) ≥ β1∧. . .∧(¬)pr i(ψm′) ≥ βm′ ,
(1)
where ϕ1, . . . , ϕm, ψ1, . . . , ψm′ ∈ Ł3(−i)+ and the “(¬)” indicates that the presence of negation is
optional.
Proof: A straightforward induction on the structure of formulas, using the observation that ¬play i(σ)
is equivalent to ∨{sigma′∈Σi:σ′ 6=σ}play i(σ′).
Lemma 4.8: If ϕ ∈ Ł3 is satisfiable, then [[ϕ]]M 6= ∅.
Proof: By Lemma 4.6, it suffices to prove the result for the case that ϕ is a basic formula. By Lemma 4.7,
it suffices to assume that the the “i-component” of the basic formula is a conjunction. We now prove the
result by induction on the depth of nesting of the modal operator pr i in ϕ. (Formally, define D(ψ), the
depth of nesting of pr i’s in ψ, by induction on the structure of ψ. if ψ has the form play j(σ), RAT j ,
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or true, then D(ψ) = 0; D(¬ψ) = D(ψ); D(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = max(D(ψ1),D(ψ2)); and D(pr i(ψ) >
α) = D(pr i(ψ) ≥ α) = 1 + D(ψ).) Because the state space Ω of M is essentially a product space,
by Lemma 4.5, it suffices to prove the result for formulas in Ł3(i)+. It is clear that ϕ possibly puts
constraints on what strategy i is using, the probability of strategy profiles in Σ−i, and the probability of
formulas that appear in the scope of pr i in ϕ. If M ′ = (Ω′, s′,F ′,PR′1, . . . ,PR′n) is a structure and
ω′ ∈ Ω′, then (M ′, ω′) |= ϕ iff s′i(ω′) and PR′i(ω′) satisfies these constraints. (We leave it to the reader
to formalize this somewhat informal claim.) By the induction hypothesis, each formula in the scope of
pr i in ϕ that is assigned positive probability by PRi(ω′) is satisfied in M . Since M is complete and
measurable, there is a state ω in M such that si(ω) = s′i(ω′) and PRi(ω) places the same constraints
on formulas that appear in ϕ as PRi. We must have (M,ω) |= ϕ.
Returning to the proof of the theorem, suppose that M = (Ω, s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn). Given a state
ω ∈ Ωc, we claim that there must be a state ω′ in M such that s(ω′) = sc(ω) and, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
PRci(ω)([[ψ]]Mc ) = PRi(ω
′)([[ψ]]M ). to show this, because of Ω is a product space, and PRi(ω′)
depends only on Ti(ω′), it suffices to show that, for each i, there exists a state ωi in M such that, for
each i, PRci(ω)([[ψ]]Mc) = PRi(ωi)([[ψ]]M ). By Lemma 4.8, if [[ψ]]Mc 6= ∅, then [[ψ]]M 6= ∅. Thus, the
existence of ωi follows from the assumption that M is complete and strongly measurable.
Roughly speaking, To understand the need for strong measurability here, note that even without
strong measurability, the argument above tells us that there exists an appropriate measure defined on
sets of the form [[ϕ]]M for ϕ in Ł3(−i)+. We can easily extend µ to a measure µ
′ on sets of the form [[ϕ]]M
for ϕ in Ł4(−i)+. However, if the set F of measurable sets in M is much richer than the sets definable
by Ł4 formulas, it is not clear that we can extend µ′ to a measure on all of F . In general, a countably
additive measure defined on a subalgebra of a set F of measurable sets cannot be extended to F . For
example, it is known that, under the continuum hypothesis, Lebesgue measure defined on the Borel
sets cannot be extended to all subsets of [0, 1] [Ulam 1930]; see [Keisler and Tarski 1964] for further
discussion). Strong measurability allows us to avoid this problem.
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